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David E. Birenbaum, Esq. 
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 800 
Washington, DC 20004-2505 
 
Dear Mr. Birenbaum: 
 
This letter is to confirm to you, for your client Coopers & Lybrand 
Australia (and its successor firm PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia), 
the conclusions reached during the June 23 telephone conference call 
with the ISB staff, the SEC staff and your firm with regard to the share 
registry service independence issues described primarily in your 
memorandum dated May 21, 1998. 
 
Your memorandum describes a likely unique set of facts in which 
Coopers & Lybrand Australia, through a now separate but affiliated 
entity, has for one or two years performed certain share registry 
services for Telstra Corporation Limited and certain related entities, 
which have not been audit clients.  However, during July 1998, 
Coopers & Lybrand Australia is expected to form 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia by merging with Price Waterhouse 
of Australia, which under contract from and in coordination with the 
Auditor General of Australia, is the auditor of Telstra in connection 
with its U.S. SEC registrant status. 
 
The Coopers & Lybrand Australia share registry services, while stated 
in your memorandum to be acceptable under Australian independence 
standards, normally would cause an impairment of independence with 
This interpretation was ratified by 




regard to an audit client that is a U.S. SEC registrant, as you are aware 
from your reference to the SEC staff’s 1993 Western Mining 
correspondence.  You believe, however, that in the Telstra case there 
exist a number of mitigating and other circumstances, some involving 
potential significant hardship to Telstra, which warrant a different, 
transition period, approach.  Specifically, you have proposed that your 
client and the merged firm in these circumstances be deemed not to 
have impaired their independence with respect to the Telstra audit until 
June 30, 1999, with the expectation that the independence concern 
would be eliminated by the sale of the services entity before that date.  
The ISB staff has addressed this issue from two viewpoints: first, 
whether there is sufficient support for some type of transitional 
approach and if so, then, how long a transition period would be 
appropriate in these circumstances. 
 
When considering whether a transitional approach is appropriate, the 
ISB staff believes that several conceptual threats arise with respect to 
the performance of the share registry services when the same firm is 
auditing Telstra’s financial statements.  That is, a reasonable investor 
might consider the firm, to a degree, to be auditing its own work, or to 
be acting as management or in the role of an employee, or creating a 
mutuality of interest with the client.  
 
However, you have represented that several mitigating factors exist in 
these circumstances to significantly counter those threats.  For 
example: 
 The Telstra audit is performed by personnel from Price Waterhouse 
of Australia, rather than from Coopers & Lybrand Australia – and 
even with respect to Coopers & Lybrand Australia the share 
registry services have been moved into a separate entity;  
 No Price Waterhouse Australia personnel have any financial 
interest in that separate entity before or after the merger; 
 Especially because of the aggregate sale of shares through the use 
of traded instalment receipts, the share registry services in question 
have no direct effect on the financial statements under audit; and 
 The Auditor General of Australia is heavily involved in the Telstra 
audit, particularly including as to areas relating to the share registry 
services.  In addition, as to registration services for TIRT (the 
Telstra Instalment Receipt Trustee Limited), a new Clearing House 
Electronic Sub-Register System (“CHESS Sub-Register”) for the 
market trades of the Australian Stock Exchange automatically 
communicates virtually all of TIRT’s transfer information, and that 
CHESS Sub-Register is reviewed by a different major auditing 
firm.  Further, the Bank of New York, not Coopers & Lybrand 
Australia, serves as Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to the 




In addition, we note that in certain circumstances – e.g., the Western 
Mining case referred to in your memorandum - the SEC staff 
previously has granted limited relief relating to Australian share 
registry services. We also note that Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (c) 
provides that in considering independence matters “the Commission 
will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances,” and 
that elsewhere in the SEC literature there is provision allowing auditors 
to provide certain otherwise problematic services on a temporary or 
emergency basis, and this limited transition situation is temporary. 
 
Considering the above mitigating circumstances and precedent, the ISB 
staff concludes that there is sufficient support in these circumstances 
for the implementation of a transition period approach. 
 
As to the appropriate length of the transition period, as we discussed 
with you on June 23, the ISB staff does not agree that the firm should 
be considered independent throughout Telstra’s entire fiscal year ended 
June 30, 1999, as you requested.  Instead, we believe that, in these facts 
and circumstances and as to this matter only, the merged firm, 
continuing through a related entity to provide the services in question, 
should be considered independent after July 1, 1998 for a limited 
transitional period, but only up until the date it starts substantive 
“interim” work procedures (e.g., internal controls testing) for that fiscal 
year June 30, 1999 audit, which you indicated likely would be in March 
or April of 1999.  As you described in your memorandum, the firm 
expects to resolve this independence concern prior to that date through 
appropriately disposing of the entity providing those services.  Further, 
until the independence concern is resolved, the previously described 
separation of the services entity, and of (former) Coopers & Lybrand 
Australia personnel from the (former) Price Waterhouse Australia audit 
should be enforced. 
 
Several other factors you have presented, and upon which 
representations we rely in forming our conclusions, were helpful as 
follows: 
 This independence concern arises in July 1998 solely due to 
completion of the merger – no services causing impairment were 
knowingly undertaken.  In addition, once identified, even before 
completion of the merger the firm has taken responsible and prompt 
action (i.e., to sell the entity providing those services) to eliminate 
the concern; 
 Resignation of the share registry services engagement does not 
appear reasonably practicable in a period shorter than that in which 
the firm is expected to sell the entity performing the services (for 
reasons expressed in your memorandum); and 
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 Resignation of the audit engagement in the near future would 
appear likely to cause serious disruption to the registrant at times of 
important activity (for reasons expressed in your memorandum). 
 
Our analysis also notes that Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (b), as to 
financial interests, defines in the authoritative literature the relevant 
independence period as “during the period of his professional 
engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on or at 
the date of his report….” While the above described independence 
threats conceptually exist from the date of the merger, we believe that 
those threats would become significantly stronger when the share 
registry services were being performed during the period in which the 
completely merged firm was performing substantive audit procedures.  
Therefore, in these circumstances, the ISB staff considers it necessary 
to require that the transition period threats be negated before the 
commencement of substantive (interim) procedures for the June 30, 
1999 audit, scheduled to start in March or April 1999.  
 
The above ISB staff conclusions relate solely to the specific facts and 
circumstances of this highly unusual situation; different facts may lead 
to different conclusions, and our conclusions rely upon the 
representations you have made to us. 
 In addition, the ISB staff does not necessarily agree with all 
arguments made in your correspondence – in particular (but not 
only) your statement in item 8.1 of your May 21 memo that “Until 
the Share Transfer in early December 1998, the SRS Entity will 
provide registry services primarily to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, 
and these services will not impair the Merged Firm’s independence 
in relation to Telstra.” 
 Further, as agreed, this response to your issue addresses only the 
situation in which the sale of the share registry services entity is 
made to an independent party and involves no earnout, guarantee of 
future revenue, or similar contingency.  Any such contingencies 
introduced into the sale would be new facts to be separately 
evaluated; as we discussed, the ISB staff has significant 
reservations with regard to the effectiveness of a “sale” as a 
resolution to an underlying independence concern when such 
contingencies are present. 
 
As we discussed in our June 23 conference call that included the SEC 
staff, we confirm our understanding that under the SEC’s Financial 
Reporting Release 50 and the ISB’s Operating Policies, the conclusions 
stated in this letter may be relied upon, as to this case, only by the 
parties directly affected by them.  You listed the following as expected 
affected parties: Coopers & Lybrand Australia, Price Waterhouse of 
Australia, TIRT, the ESOP Trustee, Telstra, and the Commonwealth of 
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Australia.  We presume that PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia also 
soon should be viewed as an affected party. 
 
Please notify us upon the occurrence of the first of any of the 
determinative events referred to above (such as the sale of the share 
registry services entity), or of any other relevant and important matters 
(such as the public announcement of the intent to sell the share registry 
services entity as described in our agreement to time-limited 
confidentiality).  Also, please remember that this interpretive letter, and 
the memoranda you have submitted to us on this matter, will be subject 
to being made public in accordance with ISB policies and practices at 
















David E. Birenbaum, Esq. 
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson                    CONFIDENTIAL 
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 800  (Subsequently  
Washington, D.C. 20004-2505         released) 
 
Dear Mr. Birenbaum: 
 
The ISB staff has received your Request for Interpretation/Advice 
dated May 21, 1998, on behalf of your client, Coopers & Lybrand of 
Australia, and your request for confidential treatment.  The ISB staff 
agrees to provide confidential treatment as described below. 
 
 The private business information and strategies disclosed in your 
request provide appropriate basis for limited confidential treatment. 
 
 However, that basis substantially expires at the earlier of:  the 
public announcement by Coopers & Lybrand or certain of its 
partners  of the intent to sell the share registry services entity, or the 
abandonment of C&L efforts to sell that entity accompanied by 
 
6 
resolution of the independence question in another manner, but in 
no case later than July 1, 1999.  (Because this business is located in 
Australia, we request you to notify us if, and when, such a public 
announcement, or an abandonment of such efforts to sell, occur.) 
 
 Upon reaching the appropriate date as described directly above, the 
ISB staff will deem its grant of confidential treatment to be ended.  
Thereafter, the typical information for our formal interpretive 
consultations could, and likely would, be made public by the ISB 
staff, including on our website.  Information subject to being made 
public would include our response letter (not yet prepared), your 
memo dated May 21, 1998, including attachments (specifically 
including certain previous correspondence relating to “Western 








-  As to any such ISB staff publication, we would be willing to 
consider, although not committing to accept, any requests you 
might make to “redact” any specific numbers or information 
that you at that time believe still to be of a confidential nature. 
 
 In addition, you have requested that the SEC staff be involved in 
the consultations on this issue.  Your May 21 memo indicates that 
you will arrange confidential treatment of your materials with the 
SEC staff and their appropriate access to these materials. 
 
We will proceed with our review of your request and coordinate 
comments with the SEC staff, and will contact you as soon as 
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Richard H. Towers  
Technical Director  
Independence Standards Board  
1211 Avenue of the Americas  
6th Floor 





We wish to inform you that PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") 
in Australia has completed the sale of its share registry services entity 
to an independent party.  The sale does not involve any “earn-out,” 
guarantee of future revenue by PwC or other such contingency. 
 
Prior to the publication of your interpretive letter and our 
submissions to the Independence Standards Board regarding Coopers & 
Lybrand's share registry business in Australia, we would like to redact 
certain privileged or confidential information from the submissions.  
Please contact us at your earliest convenience to discuss this matter. 
 
     Sincerely, 
 
 




















June 8, 1998 
 









Richard H. Towers 
Technical Director 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
6th Floor 




 This letter contains responses to questions you have raised 
subsequent to our submission of a request for interpretive guidance on 
behalf of our client, Coopers & Lybrand of Australia (“C&L 
Australia”). 
 
1.  Telstra 
 
 Telstra Corporation Limited currently is the largest 




2. Dividend Payments 
 
 C&L Australia does not exercise custody over Telstra's 




3. Telstra Audit Plan 
 
 For the year ending June 30, 1999, the audit plan for the 
Telstra audit is as follows: 
 
November 1998 Completion of audit plan 
 
March – April 1999 Internal controls testing 
(review of key control 
systems; detailed testing of 
transactions that generate 
entries to Telstra’s ledgers) 
 
June 1999 Pre-final audit 
 
Mid-July – August 1999 Final audit 
 
 In addition to these dates, Price Waterhouse of Australia 
will conduct a half-year review for Australian purposes 
during mid-January and February 1999.   
 
 If the Commonwealth of Australia conducts a further 





 Computershare is independent of C&L Australia.   
 
5. Sale of the Share Registry Practice 
 
 The sale of the share registry practice could involve either 
of two contingencies, although the likelihood of a 
contingency has not yet been determined.  
 
 First, the purchaser may require a guarantee that the share 
registry practice will not suffer a significant decline in the 
year following the sale.  Second, the parties may wish to 
structure a portion of the payment as an “earn-out,” under 
which C&L Australia would be entitled to a share of the 
profits of the share registry practice for a number of years 
following the sale. 
 
 With respect to the first potential contingency, the share 
registry practice’s most significant client, Telstra, likely 
would provide the purchaser with a comfort letter as to its 
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commitment as a client.  Such a letter should obviate the 
need for a guarantee. 
 
 With respect to the earn-out, none is currently planned, and 
we propose that the request for interpretive guidance be 
considered on that basis.  Should circumstances change in 
this respect, C&L Australia will undertake to inform the ISB 
and seek concurrence that the specific payment arrangement 
would not impair independence. 
 
6. Effect of Sale on Proposed Merger 
 
 The proposed sale of the share registry practice will not 
have any effect on the terms of the proposed merger of the 
Australian Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand firms.  
The terms do not reflect any assumptions as to the going-
concern value of that practice. 
 
 
 Please contact us if you have any further questions. 
 

















May 21, 1998 
(Appendices not included herein) 
         








Mr. Richard H. Towers 
Technical Director 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
6th Floor 
New York, New York  10036-8775 
 
Dear Mr. Towers: 
 
 This letter confirms and supplements the information presented 
in the Request For Interpretation/Advice (the “Request”) submitted on 
behalf of our client, Coopers & Lybrand of Australia (“C&L 
Australia”), on May 8, 1998 and at our meeting of May 13, 1998.  As 
noted in the Request, C&L Australia has concluded that the continued 
provision of certain share registry services by a partnership owned by 
partners of C&L Australia (the “SRS Entity”) to Telstra Corporation 
Limited (“Telstra”), for a limited and reasonable time not to extend 
beyond Telstra’s fiscal year-end on June 30, 1999, would not impair the 
independence of Telstra’s auditor in the United States, Price 
Waterhouse of Australia (“PW Australia”), were PW Australia to 
merge with C&L Australia.  PW Australia has reviewed this matter and 
concurs with C&L Australia’s conclusion.  We request your 
confirmation that, under the facts and circumstances detailed below, the 
merged firm of C&L Australia and PW Australia (the “Merged Firm”), 
should it be established, would be independent with respect to audit 
work performed subsequent to the merger relating to financial 
statements included in registration statements, forms and reports filed 
by Telstra with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or 
“Commission”) under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et 
seq. (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (the “Exchange Act”).  The basis for C&L 
Australia’s conclusion is set forth below. 
 
1. Introduction and Executive Summary 
1.1 The potential independence issue which is addressed 
herein arises out of the proposed merger of the member 
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firms of the Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse 
worldwide organizations, including C&L Australia and 
PW Australia (the “Merger”).  If the Merger is approved 
by government regulators and, subsequently, by the 
various member firms of the two organizations, it will 
likely take place in July 1998 (the “Merger Date”). 
1.2 Telstra is an Australian telecommunications company 
registered with the SEC and two-thirds owned by the 
Commonwealth of Australia (the “Commonwealth”).  
C&L Australia is providing certain share registry 
services in Australia to three entities relevant here:  
Telstra; Telstra Instalment Receipt Trustee Limited 
(“TIRT”), a trustee established by the Commonwealth to 
facilitate the partial privatization of Telstra; and Telstra 
ESOP Trustee Pty Limited, a trustee established by 
Telstra to administer its employee share ownership plan 
(the “ESOP Trustee”).  The auditor of Telstra, TIRT and 
the ESOP Trustee is the Auditor General of the 
Commonwealth.  PW Australia performs audit services 
solely for Telstra under contract with the Auditor 
General and serves as Telstra’s auditor in connection 
with its filings with the SEC.  PW Australia does not 
perform audit services for TIRT or the ESOP Trustee 
either directly or indirectly under contract with the 
Auditor General. 
1.3 In the partial privatization of Telstra in November 1997, 
the Commonwealth offered one-third of its shares in 
Telstra to the public, with payment to be made in two 
instalments.  The first instalment was payable in 
November 1997.  The second instalment is payable on 
November 17, 1998.  Upon payment of the first 
instalment, the Commonwealth transferred one-third of 
its shares to TIRT, which then issued to share applicants 
one Instalment Receipt (“IR”) for each allocated share.  
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Each Instalment Receipt represents a beneficial interest 
in the underlying share held by TIRT, and Instalment 
Receipt holders are entitled to dividend and voting 
rights.  If the share applicants pay the second instalment 
on November 17, 1998, TIRT will transfer the shares to 
them.  As a practical matter, the transfer of shares to the 
Instalment Receipt holders likely will not occur until 
early December 1998 (the “Share Transfer”).  Further 
information regarding these arrangements is set out in 
Telstra’s Amendment No. 3 to Form F-1 (filed with the 
SEC on November 10, 1997), in particular the sections 
entitled “Description of Shares,” “Description of the 
Instalment Receipts and Trust Deed” and “Description 
of Interim American Depository Receipts and American 
Depository Receipts,” as well as the Memorandum of 
Understanding among the Commonwealth, Telstra, 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, which are appended hereto 
(Appendixes A1 - 4, respectively). 
1.4 The Australian Securities Commission has stated that 
the provision of shareholder registry services to audit 
clients in Australia does not impair independence.  The 
SEC Staff, however, required C&L Australia several 
years ago to cease providing share registry services 
(within a period no shorter than eight months) to an 
audit client in Australia, Western Mining Corporation. 
1.5 While C&L Australia considers the Telstra situation 
clearly distinguishable from Western Mining, the firm is 
pursuing a plan to divest its share registry practice to 
unrelated third parties within a reasonable period after 
the Merger Date and prior to the end of Telstra’s fiscal 
year on June 30, 1999.  In this regard, C&L Australia 
has retained an adviser, prepared an information 




1.6 Telstra, TIRT, the ESOP Trustee and C&L Australia 
seek to avoid any precipitous disruption of service in 
connection with the divestment, particularly during a 
period in which TIRT will transfer shares to the 
Instalment Receipt holders and the Commonwealth may 
conduct a further offering of Telstra shares (possibly 
before the end of 1998).  In connection with such an 
offering, Telstra would file a Form F-1 or F-2 with the 
Commission.  Telstra will also file a Form 20-F annual 
report with the Commission in September or October 
1998 and may conduct a registered debt offering late this 
year or early next year. 
1.7 C&L Australia believes that a period of 12 months 
constitutes a reasonable time frame within which to 
divest the share registry practice.  The proposed period 
of 12 months is reasonable and necessary in light of 
(i) the requirements of Telstra and TIRT with respect to 
the Share Transfer, and of Telstra with respect to the 
prospective further privatization (which would be, by 
far, the largest ever in Australia), (ii) the commercial 
impracticability (because of the extensive preparation 
required to perform these services, including the 
implementation of state-of-the-art technology) of 
retaining a suitable replacement service provider within 
a shorter time frame, if C&L Australia were to resign, 
(iii) the time required to accomplish a divestiture, 
(iv) the hardship to Telstra that would result if PW 
Australia were to resign as auditor in connection with its 
filings with the SEC and (v) the numerous safeguards 
which mitigate any potential threat to the independence 
of the Merged Firm during the period of divestiture.  
Finally, a 12-month period is within the range of 
transition periods allowed in analogous circumstances 
by the SEC and other regulatory agencies. 
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2. Share Registry Services Provided to Telstra, TIRT and the 
ESOP Trustee by C&L Australia 
2.1 It is common practice in Australia for accounting firms 
to maintain the records of share ownership of publicly-
listed companies.  Share registrars in Australia perform 
more limited functions than transfer agents in the United 
States, which typically sign stock certificates and 
dividend checks and exercise control over dividend bank 
accounts.  Thus, C&L Australia, like other Australian 
registrars, maintains a register of shareholder names, 
addresses and number of shares owned, attends to 
shareholder inquiries, calculates dividend check 
amounts, and performs a number of other ministerial 
functions, such as providing information to third parties 
to facilitate the distribution by such third parties of 
written materials and dividends to shareholders.1  C&L 
Australia has implemented procedures to ensure that 
Telstra exercises managerial responsibility for the 
payment of dividends.  The client retains responsibility 
for its shareholder register as well.  C&L Australia has 
agreed also to administer any dividend reinvestment 
plan or bonus share issue plan approved by Telstra.  
However, no such plan presently exists, and Telstra is 
not expected to approve any such plan (which requires 
authorization of the Parliament) prior to the divestment 
of the share registry business.  A comprehensive 
summary of the share registry services C&L Australia 
has agreed to provide to Telstra, TIRT and the ESOP 
Trustee is presented in Appendix B. 
                                                 
1  C&L Australia has contracted with Computershare Pty Ltd 
(“Computershare”), a major provider of share registry computer services in 
Australia, to perform certain of these services for TIRT, the ESOP Trustee 
and Telstra.  Computershare operates and maintains the computer system on 
which the registers for these entities are maintained.  C&L Australia has on-
line access to the Computershare system. 
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2.2 Since 1994 (and subsequent to the issuance of the 
Western Mining letter), the Australian Stock Exchange 
(“ASX”) has assumed legal responsibility for recording 
the holdings of participants in the Clearing House 
Electronic Sub-Register System, or “CHESS,” the 
ASX’s electronic settlement system.  This section of the 
register, which is called the “CHESS Sub-Register,” is 
deemed by law to be part of the legal and principal 
register of the company.  Also since 1994, the ASX has 
been required to advise share registrars electronically of 
all share transfers arising from trades on the ASX. 
2.3 The ASX retains independent auditors (KPMG) to 
review the reliability and integrity of the CHESS Sub-
Register and share transfers advised electronically by the 
ASX. 
2.4 C&L Australia does not provide share registry services 
to Telstra in the United States.  Rather, these services 
are provided by the Bank of New York, Telstra’s U.S. 
transfer agent.  The Bank of New York maintains a 
register of American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”), 
which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  
Telstra shares underlying such ADRs are deposited with 
a custodian bank in Australia and transferred, in the 
name of the custodian bank, on the share register in 
Australia.  Telstra shares also were registered and sold 
to U.S. investors in the partial privatization and are now 
held by U.S. investors.  Transfers of such shares 
typically take place through CHESS, although off-
market transfers can also occur. 
3. Relevant Independence Principles 
3.1 Regulation S-X sets forth the form and content of, and 
requirements for, financial statements required to be 
filed by public companies with the Commission under 
 
18 
various provisions of the federal securities laws.2  
Article 2 of Regulation S-X contains certain rules 
relating to the “Qualifications and Reports of 
Accountants.”  Rule 2-01, which is part of Article 2, sets 
forth the Commission’s only substantive rule addressing 
the independence of public accountants.3  Rule 2-01 was 
adopted in 1940, replacing earlier independence 
standards that were promulgated under the Securities 
Act.4 
3.2 Rule 2-01(c) provides that: 
In determining whether an 
accountant may in fact be not 
independent with respect to a 
particular person, the Commission 
will give appropriate 
consideration to all relevant 
circumstances, including evidence 
bearing on all relationships 
between the accountant and that 
person or any affiliate thereof, 
and will not confine itself to the 
relationships existing in 
                                                 
2  See Rule 1-01(a) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(a) (1997). 
3  See, e.g., Qualifications and Reports of Accountants; Proposed Amendment 
of Rules Regarding Independence of Accountants, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,265 (Oct. 
25, 1982) (noting proposal by the Commission “to amend its rule regarding 
the independence of accountants * * * 2-01”) (emphasis supplied).  
4  See Article 14, Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, 
Federal Trade Commission (July 6, 1933), subsequently adopted as Article 
14, Rules, Regulations and Opinions under the Securities Act of 1933, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 29, 1935).  See also Rule 650, 




connection with the filings of 
reports with the Commission.5 
 
The SEC has stated that Rule 2-01(c) is intended to 
allow the Commission to take into consideration “the 
existence of particular relationships [that] might be 
relevant to its determination whether the accountant was 
in fact independent.”6  Moreover, the Commission has 
stated that “[n]o set of rules or compilation of 
representative situations can embrace all the 
circumstances which could affect such a determination”7 
and that “situations arise which require judgment in 
determining whether the Commission’s standards of 
independence have been met . . .”8   
 
3.3 More recently, the SEC issued a “Statement of Policy on 
the Establishment and Improvement of Standards 
Related to Auditor Independence,”9 a portion of which is 
described as setting forth the Commission’s 
independence standard.  The Commission stated that the 
basic test for auditor independence is “whether a 
reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would perceive an auditor as having 
neither mutual nor conflicting interests with its audit 
                                                 
5  17 C.F.R. § 201.2-01(c) (1997). 
6  Accounting Series Release (“ASR”) No. 44 [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,062 at 62,134 (May 24, 1943).  A former SEC 
Chairman has observed that Rule 2-01(c) was intended to underscore that 
“independence was a question of fact, to be determined after examining all 
the evidence that might bear upon the existence or non-existence of that 
fact.”  Purcell, “Cooperation Between SEC and Public Accountants,” J. OF 
ACCT., 155-56 (August, 1943). 
7  Section 602.02a of the Codification, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,257 at 
62,885. 
8  Id. 
9  Exchange Act Release No. 39,676 (Feb. 18, 1998). 
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client and as exercising objective and impartial 
judgment on all issues brought to the auditor’s 
attention.”10  The Commission noted further that in 
determining whether an auditor is independent, it 
“considers all relevant facts and circumstances, and its 
consideration is not confined to relationships existing in 
connection with the filing of reports with the 
Commission.”11 
3.4 In addition to Rule 2-01, Section 600 of the Codification 
of Financial Reporting Policies and SEC policy 
statements, the SEC’s independence requirements are 
reflected in no-action letters issued by the OCA.  In 
several letters, the OCA has stated that, absent an SEC 
rule or interpretation to the contrary, it looks to AICPA 
standards for guidance.12  Rule 101 of the AICPA’s 
Code of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] member 
in public practice shall be independent in the 
performance of professional services as required by 
standards promulgated by bodies designated by [the 
AICPA’s Council].”13  Pursuant to Rule 101, the AICPA 
has issued a series of interpretations and ethics rulings 
on auditor independence. 
                                                 
10  Id. 
11  Id. (citing Rule 2-01(c)). 
12  See, e.g., Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, SEC No-Action Letter [1982-1983 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,398 at 78,455 (Jan. 14, 
1983).  
13  See AICPA Professional Standards, Code of Professional Conduct (“ET”) § 
101.01.  In addition, the AICPA’s professional standards state that 
“[i]ndependent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should 
avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.” See 




3.5 While the SEC has declined to adopt rules limiting the 
performance of specific types of non-audit services by 
accounting firms for audit clients, the Commission has 
asserted in other pronouncements that it will not 
consider accountants independent, if they assume 
managerial or decision-making responsibilities on behalf 
of clients while performing non-attest services.  
Specifically, while acknowledging that “independent 
public accountants often advise management and offer 
professional advice on matters dealing with financial 
operations,” Section 602.02.c.i of the Codification 
provides that “managerial and decision-making 
functions are the responsibility of the client and not of 
the independent accountant.”14  Section 602.02.c.i 
further states that: 
Managerial responsibility begins 
when the accountant becomes, or 
appears to become, so identified 
with the client’s management as 
to be indistinguishable from it.  In 
making a determination of 
whether this degree of 
identification has been reached, 
the basic consideration is 
whether, to a third party, the 
client appears to be 
(i) substantially dependent upon 
the accountant’s skill and 
judgment in its financial 
operations, or (ii) reliant only to 
the extent of the customary type 
of consultation or advice.15  
                                                 
14  7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,263 at 62,890. 




This restriction is based on the Commission’s view that 
“[i]f the independent accountant were to perform 
functions of this nature, he would develop, or appear to 
develop, a mutuality of interest with his client which 
would differ only in degree, but not in kind, from that of 
an employee,” in which case “it may be logically 
inferred that the accountant’s professional judgment 
toward the particular client might be prejudiced in that 
he would, in effect, be auditing the results of his own 
work.”16 
 
3.6 In light of the Commission’s concern with “self-
review,” Section 602.02.c.i also sets forth the SEC’s 
position that “an accounting firm cannot be deemed 
independent with regard to auditing financial statements 
of a client if it has participated closely, either manually 
or through its computer systems, in maintenance of the 
basic accounting records and preparation of the financial 
statements, or if the firm performs other accounting 
services through which it participates with management 
in operational decisions.”17  
4. A Reasonable Transition Period is Required to Divest the 
Share Registry Practice 
4.1 As noted above in section 1.1, any independence issue 
that arises with respect to the SRS Entity’s performance 
of share registry services for Telstra will arise solely as a 
result of the Merger.  In anticipation of the Merger, 
C&L Australia has actively developed and pursued a 
plan to divest its share registry practice.  Divestment, 
however, cannot be accomplished immediately as of the 
                                                 
16  Id. 
17  Id.  
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Merger Date.  A reasonable transition period is required 
to avoid serious disruption to Telstra, TIRT and the 
ESOP Trustee. 
4.2 C&L Australia believes that a period of 12 months 
constitutes a reasonable and necessary time frame within 
which to accomplish divestiture of the share registry 
practice.  A number of factors support this view.  First, 
TIRT, the ESOP Trustee, Telstra and C&L Australia 
wish to minimize disruption during a period in which 
two major undertakings regarding the registers will be 
implemented.  Second, resignation from the share 
registry engagements or the audit engagement is not 
commercially practicable.  Third, a number of 
safeguards mitigate substantially whatever perceived 
threat to independence may arise from the Merger 
during the period of divestiture.  Finally, the proposed 
12-month period is required by the particular facts and 
circumstances of the TIRT, ESOP Trustee and Telstra 
engagements and is consistent with guidance provided 
by the SEC and its Staff and other regulatory agencies, 
which have granted appropriate transitional relief in 
analogous situations.  
5. The Need to Avoid Serious Disruption  
5.1 C&L Australia’s request for a reasonable transition 
period must be viewed in light of the particular facts and 
circumstances presented by its engagements with TIRT, 
the ESOP Trustee and Telstra.  Specifically, TIRT must 
transfer shares of Telstra to over 1.5 million Instalment 
Receipt holders in early December 1998, following 
payment of the second instalment on November 17, 
1998.  The logistical requirements associated with 
assisting TIRT to process these payments and transfer 
the shares to the Instalment Receipt holders are of 
extraordinary size and complexity.  TIRT and C&L 
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Australia have made substantial investments in 
preparing for these tasks. 
5.2 A second major undertaking affecting TIRT, the ESOP 
Trustee and Telstra is the Commonwealth’s planned sale 
of its remaining holdings in Telstra.  The Australian 
government has announced that it will sell the final two-
thirds of its shares in Telstra if it is re-elected in the 
election anticipated to occur late in 1998 or early in 
1999.  Preliminary planning for a second public offering 
of Telstra shares currently is underway. 
5.3 Preparation for these major undertakings, which has 
been substantial, cannot readily be duplicated by an 
alternative service provider.  The Commonwealth 
tentatively appointed C&L Australia registrar for its sale 
of Telstra shares in June 1997, following an exhaustive 
tender process commenced two months earlier.  Prior to 
that time, C&L Australia spent over 12 months 
researching and identifying improved technological 
methods for handling the Telstra assignment.  Although 
C&L Australia had administered the registers associated 
with the five largest offerings in Australia’s history, 
public announcements indicated that the Telstra offering 
could be up to ten times larger than any preceding it.  
The industry acknowledged that new and innovative 
processes, involving state-of-the-art technology, would 
be essential to meet the volume and complexity of the 
Telstra assignment.  After lengthy negotiations, the 
Commonwealth in September 1997 officially appointed 
C&L Australia registrar for its sale of Telstra shares, 
and, in October 1997, the Commonwealth appointed 
C&L Australia registrar for a two-year term for the 
ongoing TIRT and Telstra registers. 
5.4 The Commonwealth’s offering of one-third of its shares 
in Telstra in November 1997 was the largest public 
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offering in Australia’s history.  The offering generated 
approximately 1.9 million share applicants, six times 
more than any previous offering in Australia.  
Implementation of the TIRT register was a substantial 
logistical task.  (Redacted) 
5.5 C&L Australia’s request for a reasonable transition 
period is designed to reassure its clients that divestiture 
will take place in an orderly process that will not 
jeopardize either the planning or implementation of the 
Share Transfer or second public offering. 
6. Resignation from the Registry Engagements is Not 
Commercially Practicable in a Term Shorter than that 
Required for Divestiture 
6.1 The SRS Entity’s resignation from the TIRT, ESOP 
Trustee and Telstra engagements would impose 
significant inconvenience and hardship on its clients.  
Given the approaching date of the Share Transfer and 
the possibility of a second public offering shortly 
thereafter, and considering the knowledge gained to date 
by personnel of C&L Australia and the infrastructure 
developed (as described above) to meet the requirements 
of TIRT, the ESOP Trustee and Telstra, resignation 
would seriously jeopardize satisfactory completion of 
the Share Transfer and implementation of the second 
public offering (if the Commonwealth decides to 
proceed with it). 
6.2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an alternative service 
provider could assume the registry engagements in a 
time frame shorter than the one C&L Australia proposes 
for divestment.  Only one other registrar in Australia 
currently is large enough to contemplate the second 
instalment and second public offering of Telstra shares.  
That registrar is preparing for two other large public 
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offerings, one involving the demutualization of AMP 
Society and the other involving the sale by the New 
South Wales Government of all of its shares in TAB 
Limited (a state-owned wagering operator).  The AMP 
Society demutualization will create a register of up to 
1.5 million shareholders (equal in size to the present 
TIRT register), while the TAB Limited offering is 
expected to generate from 500,000 to 1 million 
shareholders.  Already facing significant challenges to 
meet its obligations under existing engagements, this 
registrar will not be prepared to replace the SRS Entity 
in the short term as registrar for TIRT, the ESOP Trustee 
and Telstra.  Notably, C&L Australia declined to tender 
for the AMP Society demutualization, recognizing that it 
did not have sufficient resources to perform both 
assignments satisfactorily.  Under these circumstances, 
transfer of the TIRT, ESOP Trustee and Telstra registers 
to a different service provider is not commercially 
practicable in the short term.  The period realistically 
required to replace the SRS Entity as registrar is 
explained in section 9.2. 
7. Resignation from the Telstra Audit Would Cause Significant 
Hardship to Telstra  
7.1 PW is obligated under contract with the Auditor General 
to perform audit services for Telstra for the fiscal years 
ending June 30, 1998 and June 30, 1999.   
7.2 PW’s resignation from the Telstra audit as of the Merger 
Date would jeopardize Telstra’s filing of financial 
statements in Australia and the United States for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1998.   
7.3 PW’s resignation from the Telstra audit prior to 
completion of the June 30, 1999 audit would be 
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impractical and highly disruptive to Telstra for the 
following reasons: 
7.3.1 Significant physical disruption to multiple 
Telstra divisions and senior management 
during start up phase of new auditor; 
7.3.2 Potential impact on Telstra’s ability to file on a 
timely basis six-month and yearly financial 
statements in Australia and the United States; 
7.3.3 Potential impact on the Commonwealth’s 
timetable for conducting second tranche of the 
Telstra privatization; 
7.3.4 Disruption to other associated audit activities, 
including regulatory accounts, Japanese 
Securities Registration, and filing 
requirements. 
7.4 The appointment of an additional auditor by Telstra for 
U.S. purposes (and retention of PW for Australian 
purposes) would be impractical and highly disruptive to 
Telstra for the same reasons.  The appointment of an 
additional auditor also would impose duplicate costs on 
Telstra. 
8. No Independence Issue Arises Prior to December 1998, and, 
Thereafter, a Number of Safeguards Mitigate Substantially 
Any Perceived Threat to Independence During the Period of 
Divestiture 
8.1 Until the Share Transfer in early December 1998, the 
SRS Entity will provide registry services primarily to 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, and these services will not 




8.1.1 The provision of registry services to TIRT and 
the ESOP Trustee will not give rise to any 
potential for self-review. 
(a) Neither TIRT nor the ESOP Trustee is an 
audit client of PW Australia or C&L 
Australia or will be an audit client of the 
Merged Firm.  Rather, the Auditor 
General serves as the auditor of both 
entities.  It should be noted in this 
connection that the SEC accepts foreign 
governmental auditing agencies, such as 
the Auditor General, as auditor of 
government agencies in connection with 
registration statements, forms and reports 
filed with the Commission.  See, e.g., 
Rule 2-03 of Regulation S-X. 
 
(b) The financial accounts of TIRT and the 
ESOP Trustee will not be consolidated 
with those of Telstra.   
 
(c) The records the SRS Entity will maintain 
in relation to registry services provided to 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee: 
 
 do not form the basis for the 
preparation or review of accounting 
entries or financial records of Telstra,  
 
 have no bearing on the financial 
statements of Telstra, and  
 
 are not accounting records. 
 
(d) PW Australia does not examine any 
aspect of the instalment receipt register of 
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TIRT in connection with its audit of 
Telstra.  Nor does PW Australia examine 
in that regard TIRT’s or Telstra’s 
performance of its responsibilities to 
holders of instalment receipts. 
 
8.1.2 The services provided to TIRT and the ESOP 
Trustee do not involve the assumption of 
managerial responsibilities on behalf of 
Telstra.   
(a) TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, entities 
separate and distinct from Telstra, are 
managed independently of Telstra.  
Telstra neither supervises nor controls 
TIRT or the ESOP Trustee.  The SRS 
Entity’s performance of services for 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, therefore, 
will not relieve Telstra of managerial 
responsibilities. 
 
(b) Both TIRT and the ESOP Trustee owe 
fiduciary obligations to trust 
beneficiaries, not to Telstra.  TIRT owes 
its fiduciary obligations to Instalment 
Receipt holders.  The ESOP Trustee 
owes its fiduciary obligations to 
participants in Telstra’s employee share 
ownership plan (prior to the Share 
Transfer, to participating employees 
holding instalment receipts and, 
thereafter, to employee shareholders to 





8.2 The potential independence issue relating to Telstra does 
not arise until early December 1998, when TIRT 
transfers the Telstra shares to the Instalment Receipt 
holders.  Maintenance of the Telstra share register will 
be merely a formality prior to that time, because the 
register will contain only two shareholders:  the 
Commonwealth and TIRT.  The principal services the 
SRS Entity will provide to Telstra before the Share 
Transfer relate to the holding of Telstra’s Annual 
General Meeting on November 6, 1998.  These services, 
involving such tasks as the distribution of meeting 
notices and collection and counting of ballots, will be 
essentially ministerial and unrelated to maintenance of 
Telstra’s share register.18  Accordingly, we see no basis 
for concluding that the provision of share registry 
services by the SRS Entity to Telstra would give rise to 
any potential impairment of independence prior to the 
Share Transfer. 
8.3 No partner of the Merged Firm other than present 
partners of C&L Australia will derive any financial 
benefit from the provision of share registry services to 
Telstra.  This is because C&L Australia will transfer the 
share registry line of business to the SRS Entity prior to 
the Merger.  The SRS Entity will be owned by the 
present partners of C&L Australia.  Further, the present 
C&L Australia partners will be walled off from any 
audit services performed for Telstra.  Such services will 
be the sole responsibility of the former PW partners.  
Thus, the partners who provide audit services to Telstra 
will not derive any benefit from the share registry 
engagement.  
                                                 
18  The SRS Entity also will perform certain tasks in relation to the dividend 
Telstra will pay in October 1998, principally with respect to the distribution 
of the dividend by TIRT to the Instalment Receipt holders.   
 
31 
8.4 Based upon current processing volumes for TIRT, the 
SRS Entity is expected to perform data entry for Telstra 
with respect to only 0.3% of the changes in volume on 
the Telstra share register.  These changes in volume 
reflect share transfers not executed on the ASX.  Share 
transfers executed on the ASX, which are expected to 
account for 99.7% of the changes in volume on the 
Telstra register, will be advised electronically to the SRS 
Entity.  
8.5 The audit team (i.e., the former PW personnel) will rely 
on the opinion of the Auditor General, which in turn 
relies on the opinion of KPMG, an unrelated third-party 
auditor, with respect to share transfers advised 
electronically to the SRS Entity.  Furthermore, the 
Auditor General, not the Merged Firm, retains final 
authority over the audit of Telstra’s financial statements. 
8.6 The Merged Firm intends to place reliance on the 
independent audit work of the Auditor General with 
respect to the audit of Telstra’s U.S. financial 
statements.  Under Australian Corporation Law, the 
Auditor General as part of its audit must consider 
whether Telstra has kept proper accounting records 
(including registers).  In satisfying this requirement and 
forming an audit opinion on the financial statements, the 
Auditor General will perform the following tasks: 
8.6.1 Until the time the second instalment is paid, 
the Auditor General will review the share 
register maintained by Telstra’s Company 
Secretary, which includes only two 
shareholders (the Commonwealth and TIRT). 
8.6.2 Subsequent to instalment receipt conversion, 
the Auditor General will adopt the following 
procedures for the December 31, 1998 half-
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year review/audit and June 30, 1999 annual 
audit: 
(a) request confirmation from the share 
registrar of the total issued shares and 
their paid-up value on the share register; 
 
(b) request confirmation from the share 
registrar that the register has been 
properly maintained in accordance with 
the Corporation Law; and 
 
(c) audit the confirmations received under (a) 
and (b) above via the conduct of 
independent audit testing on the share 
register.  It is important to note that the 
Auditor General will conduct this 
independent audit testing directly using 
his staff and not rely on sub-contracted 
staff from the Merged Firm. 
 
8.7 The Merged Firm’s reliance on the independent audit 
work of the Auditor General will accord with the 
practice and procedures outlined under U.S. Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (“GAAS”), in particular 
Statement of Auditing Standard 65, “The Auditor’s 
Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit 
of Financial Statements.”  The Merged Firm will 
consider the planning and findings of the work of the 
Auditor General in forming an opinion on the U.S. 
financial statements. 
8.8 The facts and circumstances stated herein distinguish the 
present situation from existing SEC and AICPA 
guidance relating to share registry services. 
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8.8.1 The Telstra situation differs significantly from 
Western Mining, where C&L Australia 
provided share registry and audit services to 
Western Mining Corporation, an SEC 
registrant, for a number of years, not as a 
consequence of a merger but in the ordinary 
course of business, and without the benefit of 
the numerous safeguards listed above in 
sections 8.3 through 8.7. 
8.8.2 Given C&L Australia’s decision to divest the 
share registry practice, the present situation 
also is distinguishable from Levitz, Zacks & 
Ciceric.19  There, the SEC Staff concluded that 
an accounting firm’s maintenance of a 
database of information on behalf of an audit 
client could adversely affect the firm’s 
independence, because the arrangement did not 
appear to be of a short-term nature. 
8.8.3 The services the SRS Entity will provide to 
Telstra are distinguishable from those 
addressed in Example 3 of Section 602.02.c.ii 
of the Codification of Financial Reporting 
Policies. 
(a) The services do not involve a “complete 
restatement” of Telstra’s shareholder 
register, as that term is used in Example 
3. 
 
(b) Instead, the services will be ministerial in 
nature.  Moreover, as indicated above, the 
SRS Entity will perform data entry with 
                                                 
19  SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 76,925, at 78,666 (Dec. 17, 1992). 
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respect to only a de minimis percentage 
(0.3%) of the changes in volume on the 
Telstra share register.  
 
(c) Other share registry services provided to 
Telstra, such as the input of data 
regarding address changes or the 
calculation of dividend check amounts, 
similarly will be clerical in nature. 
 
8.8.4 The services do not impair independence under 
Interpretation 101-3 of the AICPA’s 
independence rules.   
(a) Telstra will remain responsible for all of 
its basic accounting records and resulting 
financial statements, and no member of 
the SRS Entity, or of the Merged Firm, 
will exercise influence over Telstra’s 
operating, financial, or accounting 
policies in connection with the share 
registry business.   
 
(b) Moreover, the SRS Entity will not 
consummate transactions in Telstra stock, 
possess custody of Telstra assets, or 
exercise authority on behalf of Telstra.   
 
(c) All source documents used in the 
compilation of the share registry will be 
prepared independently of the SRS 
Entity, and the SRS Entity will not make 





8.8.5 The services do not impair independence under 
AICPA Ethics Ruling 39, which specifically 
states that if an auditor is not an “officially 
appointed stock transfer agent or registrar,” it 
may assist clients in accordance with 
Interpretation 101-3.  
(a) The SRS Entity will not act as an 
officially appointed stock transfer agent 
or registrar with respect to Telstra’s U.S. 
listed securities.  Rather, the Bank of 
New York, which currently acts as 
Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to its 
U.S. listed securities, will retain that role.  
AICPA Ethics Ruling 39 does not 
prohibit the SRS Entity or its employees 
(who will not be members of the AICPA) 
from serving as an officially appointed 
registrar in Australia with respect to 
securities not listed on U.S. exchanges. 
 
8.9 The services will not impair the appearance of the 
Merged Firm’s independence in relation to Telstra  The 
Commission has stated that the appearance of 
independence is to be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and 
circumstances.  We believe that the facts and 
circumstances described herein mitigate any perceived 
threat to the independence of the Merged Firm, and that 
a reasonable investor would not perceive any 
impairment.  In this regard, we note particularly that the 
Australian Securities Commission sanctions the 
provision of share registry services to audit clients, and 
that the Bank of New York, not the SRS Entity, will 
serve as Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to Telstra 
securities traded in the United States.  In light of these 
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and the other mitigating facts and circumstances 
described herein, we believe that a reasonable investor 
would perceive the Merged Firm as having neither 
mutual nor conflicting interests with Telstra, and as 
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues 
brought to its attention.  
9. The Proposed 12-Month Period Reflects the Particular Facts 
and Circumstances Presented Here and is Consistent with 
Analogous Guidance  
9.1 The proposed 12-month period is necessary to assure 
C&L Australia sufficient time to divest the share 
registry practice.  The primary divestment option is to 
conduct a trade sale, in which the share registry practice 
would remain intact under new ownership not affiliated 
with the Merged Firm.  C&L Australia hopes to approve 
a trade sale by mid-August 1998.  The second 
divestment option, to be pursued if a trade sale is not 
achieved, is to conduct a public offering of the share 
registry business.  If such an offering becomes 
necessary, C&L Australia would expect to conduct it by 
mid-April 1999.  The proposed divestiture period would 
grant C&L Australia an additional ten weeks beyond 
mid-April 1999, a modest extension intended to account 
for possible delays in the divestiture process  A 
timetable reflecting these two divestment options is 
attached as Appendix C1. 
9.2 The timetable outlining the two divestment options 
reflects a schedule shorter than the one required to 
resign the registry engagements.  Specifically, C&L 
Australia believes that, while it could notify TIRT, the 
ESOP Trustee and Telstra as of the Merger Date of its 
intent to resign the share registry engagements, it could 
not responsibly resign until mid-May 1999.  That is 
because any plan of resignation must recognize the 
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absence of viable alternative service providers in the 
short term, and the clients’ imperative that the Share 
Transfer in early December 1998 and a dividend 
payment in March or April 1999 not be disrupted.  In 
this regard, it should be noted that (i) Telstra could face 
exposure to substantial liability if the Share Transfer is 
not executed properly, (ii) a successful Share Transfer is 
in the interests of the Commonwealth, as well as TIRT 
and Telstra, and (iii) as noted in section 8.2, the potential 
threat to the independence of the Merged Firm does not 
arise prior to the Share Transfer.  Accordingly, C&L 
Australia’s resignation plan provides for finalization of 
the resignation process after issues related to the Share 
Transfer and dividend payment have been resolved.  A 
timetable reflecting the resignation option is attached as 
Appendix C2. 
9.3 The proposed 12-month period is within a range of 
transition periods allowed in similar situations by the 
SEC and other regulatory agencies.   
9.3.1 The Commission’s independence requirements 
do not specifically discuss transitional 
arrangements designed to address issues that 
arise as the result of a merger of two 
accounting firms, and no controlling precedent 
exists as to what constitutes a reasonable 
approach to such issues.  However, both Rule 
2-01 and other Commission pronouncements 
stress the need to consider all the facts and 
circumstances bearing on a particular 
independence question.  In addition, the Office 
of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”) has 
indicated in a series of no-action letters that it 
would not question the independence of an 
accounting firm with respect to an audit client 
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for which the firm had performed, on a 
temporary or emergency basis, certain services 
that might otherwise raise independence 
concerns. 
(a) For example, in William I. Minoletti & 
Co., P.C.,20 the OCA expressed the view 
that it would not consider a firm’s 
independence impaired where, as a result 
of a change in an audit client’s ownership 
and location, the firm assisted the client 
for a period of approximately one year in 
the preparation of monthly financial 
statements and the computation of 
financial data.  An auditor’s preparation 
of a client’s financial statements poses a 
more obvious independence problem than 
does the maintenance of shareholder 
registers, which does not involve the 
preparation or review of accounting 
records.  Nevertheless, the OCA 
permitted the firm to prepare its client’s 
financial statements for twelve months. 
 
(b) Similarly, in Adler Blanchard & Co.,21 
the OCA indicated that it would not 
question the independence of a firm that 
provided “limited and mechanical” 
bookkeeping services to an audit client 
over an eight-month period.  The firm 
had provided the services as a “temporary 
                                                 
20  SEC No-Action Letter [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
77,632 at 78,922 (Mar. 27, 1984).  
21  SEC No-Action Letter [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 76,929 at 78,669 (Mar. 11, 1991). 
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solution” in anticipation of the client’s 
establishment of an in-house 
bookkeeping function.22 
 
(c) In a third no-action letter, Stanton, 
Magedanz, Edens & Co.,23 the SEC Staff 
declined to question a firm’s 
independence where, in response to an 
emergency created by the resignation of 
an audit client’s chief financial officer 
and the illness of an accounting clerk, the 
firm assisted the client for a two-month 
period in the preparation of monthly 
financial statements and performed 
additional consulting services.24 
                                                 
22  Id. at 78,670. 
23  SEC No-Action Letter [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,114 at 76,552 (June 17, 1985). 
24  See also Caldwell, Becker, Dervin, Petrick & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act LEXIS 
909 (May 10, 1995) (Staff would not question the independence of a firm 
that provided general bookkeeping and record keeping services for a two-
month period to an audit client whose bookkeeper had taken a sudden leave 
of absence for medical reasons). 
 While the OCA has indicated in this series of no-action letters that 
accounting firms may provide certain otherwise prohibited services on a 
temporary basis, it has not defined the parameters of a “temporary” period of 
time.  In adopting, and then maintaining in place, “temporary rules” under 
the federal securities laws in other contexts, however, the Commission has 
affirmatively demonstrated that the concept of “temporary” is relative and 
flexible.  Examples include the “temporary” rules and regulations adopted by 
the Commission under the Williams Act in 1968.  See EXCHANGE ACT REL. 
No. 8370 (July 30, 1968), as amended by EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 8392 
(Aug. 30, 1968), and further amended by EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 9060 
(Jan. 18, 1971).  These temporary rules and regulations were not replaced 
with “final” rules until 14 years later.  See EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 18524 
(March 3, 1982).  See also INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT REL. No. 18158 
(May 20, 1991) (proposal to rescind two “temporary” rules adopted 11 years 
earlier which exempted certain money market funds from registration); 
SECURITIES ACT REL. No. 6873 (Aug. 14, 1990) (adoption of two-year 
extension of “temporary” rule adopted six years earlier which permitted 
various filing fees to be remitted to a U.S. Treasury lockbox located in 




(d) In addition, the Codification includes two 
examples of circumstances under which 
an accounting firm may temporarily 
perform services considered 
inappropriate in other circumstances.  
Example 6 under Section 602.02.c.ii of 
the Codification states that an accounting 
firm’s independence would not be 
impaired where the firm assisted an audit 
client with its year-end bookkeeping after 
the unexpected resignation of the client’s 
comptroller, provided that the firm did 
not assume managerial responsibilities 
for the client.25  Similarly, Example 12 
under Section 602.02.g of the 
Codification indicates that, in an 
emergency or temporary situation, an 
accounting firm could rent time on the 
firm’s computer to an audit client without 
adversely affecting the firm’s 
independence.26 
 
(e) While these examples and no-action 
letters do not specifically address 
independence issues that arise as a result 
of a merger between two accounting 
firms, they are consistent with the 
Commission’s position, as stated 
                                                                                                                    
2 (1998) (exempting “transient” investment companies from the 
requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the rules and 
regulations promulgated thereunder for a period of one year). 
25  See 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,264 at 62,891. 
26  See 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,272 at 62,906. 
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elsewhere in the Codification, that 
determinations as to an accountant’s 
independence must be made “in the light 
of all the pertinent circumstances in the 
particular case.”  Moreover, these no-
action letters broadly illustrate that the 
Commission and its Staff have 
distinguished between independence 
issues that arise in the ordinary course of 
an accounting firm’s activities and those 
which arise in unusual circumstances, 
and they recognize that restrictions which 
may normally be considered necessary 
are not warranted in extraordinary 
circumstances, where independence 
policies tailored to the exigencies of the 
specific situation are more appropriate. 
 
9.3.2 In assessing the reasonableness of C&L 
Australia’s approach to independence issues 
arising with respect to Telstra solely as a result 
of the Merger, analogies also can be made to 
other situations involving business 
combinations or other exceptional events in 
which courts and regulatory agencies have 
recognized that entities may employ 
transitional arrangements to address unusual 
circumstances, while ensuring compliance with 
the fundamental policies underlying applicable 
laws and regulations.  Several of these 
analogies, drawn principally from other areas 
of securities and banking regulation, are 
discussed in Appendix D. 
9.3.3 In assessing the reasonableness of the 
requested period for divestiture, it should be 
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noted that, in Western Mining, the SEC Staff 
retroactively accepted five years’ worth of 
filings made by Western Mining Corporation 
while its auditor served (not as a consequence 
of a merger but in the ordinary course of 
business) as share registrar.  In addition, the 
SEC Staff granted the auditor a period of at 
least eight months to resign the share registry 
engagement, which we understand involved a 
stable register of only 100,000 shareholders.27  
Here, the potential independence issue arises 
solely as a result of the anticipated Merger.  
Furthermore, the issue centers upon a register 
undergoing major changes and containing over 
1.5 million Instalment Receipt holders.  Under 
these circumstances, we believe that a 12-
month divestiture period is entirely reasonable.  
10. Reliance on Guidance from the ISB Staff 
10.1 We understand that parties directly affected by an 
interpretation issued by the Staff of the Independence 
Standards Board may rely upon the interpretation. 
10.2 Financial Reporting Release (“FRR”) No. 50 provides 
that, “[p]ositions issued by the ISB staff to a particular 
party . . . may be relied upon by that party in accordance 
with the ISB Operating Policies.”28 
                                                 
27  The letter summarizing the Staff’s position is dated November 1, 1993.  The 
Staff required the auditor to resign the share registry engagement “no later 
than the time of the commencement of the year-end audit phase for the year 
ended June 30 1994.”  We understand that the year-end audit phase would 
have commenced no sooner than July 1, 1994, thus permitting the auditor at 
least eight months to resign the share registry engagement. 
28  FRR No. 50, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,450 at 62,309 n.11 (Mar. 26, 
1998) (emphasis supplied). 
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10.3 The ISB Operating Policies, in turn, provide that, 
“[a]bsent express ratification by the Board, ISB staff 
interpretations will be considered as applying only to the 
particular parties directly affected by the interpretation, 
who may rely on such interpretation.”29 
10.4 In sum, an ISB Staff interpretation may be relied upon 
by the parties directly affected by it.  In addition to C&L 
Australia, the parties directly affected by the ISB Staff 
interpretation in this matter are PW Australia, TIRT, the 
ESOP Trustee, Telstra and the Commonwealth.  These 
parties intend to rely on the Staff’s interpretation.30 
                                                 
29  ISB Operating Policies, Art. 3, § IV (emphasis supplied). 
30  FRR No. 50 provides that “[t]he Commission also retains ultimate authority 
to not accept, or to modify or supplement, ISB independence standards and 
interpretations in the same manner that the Commission can modify or 
supplement accounting standards and interpretations issued by the FASB.”  
FRR No. 50, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,450 at 62,308 (Mar. 26, 1998).  
Given the statements in FRR No. 50 and the ISB Operating Policies 
regarding reliance on ISB Staff interpretations, we understand that a decision 
by the Commission not to accept an interpretation would affect only the 





11.1 C&L Australia has concluded (and PW Australia has 
concurred) that the Merged Firm’s independence in 
relation to audit work in connection with Telstra’s 
financial statements performed before and after the 
Merger will not be impaired (i) as a result of the 
provision of share registry services by the SRS Entity to 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, or (ii) as a result of the 
provision of share registry services by the SRS Entity to 
Telstra prior to the close of its fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1999.  In particular, C&L Australia has 
concluded (and PW Australia has concurred) that the 
Merged Firm’s independence will not be impaired with 
respect to registration statements, forms and reports 
filed by Telstra with the SEC during this period.  We 
seek your concurrence with these conclusions and our 
understanding of the reliance that may be placed by 
parties directly affected by an ISB Staff interpretation 
on such interpretation. 















DRAFT REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION / ADVICE 
 
1. Person seeking advice 
1.1 Name of person seeking advice: Tony Harrington 
1.2 Position: Deputy Chairman 
1.3 If not partner, was a partner consulted: N/A 
1.4 Firm/Employer: Coopers & Lybrand 
1.5 Address: 333 Collins Street 
1.6 City: Melbourne 
1.7 State/Province: Victoria 
1.8 Zip/Postal Code: 3000 
1.9 Country: Australia 
1.10 Daytime Phone: (61 3) 9633-3311 
1.11 Fax: (61 3) 9633-3275 
 
2. Summary description of inquiry 
2.1 Would the continued provision of share registry services by Coopers & 
Lybrand (“C&L Australia”) to an Australian audit client of Price 
Waterhouse (“PW Australia”) for a limited period subsequent to the merger 
of the two firms (creating the “Merged Firm”) impair the Merged Firm’s 
independence with respect to that client? 
3. Facts 
3.1 C&L Australia provides certain share registry services in Australia to 
Telstra Corporation Limited, an Australian company registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) and 
owned two-thirds by the Commonwealth of Australia (the 
“Commonwealth”).  The Commonwealth commenced the privatization of 
one-third of Telstra in November, 1997 and may conduct a further offering 
of Telstra shares (possibly before the end of the year).  In connection with 
such an offering, Telstra would file a Form F-1 or F-2 with the 
Commission.  Telstra will also file a Form 20-F annual report with the 
Commission in September or October this year and may conduct a 
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registered debt offering late this year or early next year. 
3.2 C&L provides certain registry services to Telstra Instalment Receipt 
Trustee Limited (“TIRT”), a trustee established by the Commonwealth to 
facilitate the partial privatization of Telstra.  TIRT presently holds one-third 
of Telstra’s shares in trust for holders of Telstra Instalment Receipts, which 
are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (the “ASX”) (American 
Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) are traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange).  Instalment Receipt holders will make the second of two 
scheduled payments for Telstra shares on November 17, 1998.  Thereafter, 
likely in early December, 1998, TIRT will transfer the Telstra shares to the 
Instalment Receipt holders (the “Share Transfer”). 
3.3 C&L provides certain registry services to Telstra ESOP Trustee Pty Limited, a 
trustee established by Telstra to administer its employee share ownership 
plan (the “ESOP Trustee”). 
3.4 PW Australia performs audit services for Telstra under contract with 
Telstra’s auditor in Australia, the Auditor General of Australia, and serves 
as Telstra’s auditor in connection with its filing with the SEC of registration 
statements, forms and reports under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”).  PW does not serve as the auditor of TIRT or the ESOP Trustee.  The 
Auditor General serves as auditor of those entities, as well as Telstra.   
3.5 C&L will transfer the share registry line of business to a new entity (the 
“SRS Entity”) prior to the Merger.  The SRS Entity will be owned by the 
present partners of C&L but will not be included in the Merged Firm.  The 
present partners of C&L will play no role with respect to audit services 
performed for Telstra.  PW partners will retain sole responsibility for those 
services.  
3.6 C&L presently is pursuing a plan to divest its share registry business within 
a reasonable and limited period not to extend beyond the end of Telstra’s 
fiscal year on June 30, 1999.  Telstra and C&L seek to avoid any 
precipitous disruption of service in connection with the divestment, 
particularly during a period when the Commonwealth may conduct a 
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further offering of Telstra securities. 
4. Relevant literature 
4.1 Auditor Independence Generally 
4.1.1 Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X 
4.1.2 Section 600 of the Codification of Financial Reporting Policies 
(the “Codification”) 
4.1.3 Rule 101 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct 
4.2 Share Registry Services  
4.2.1 Levitz, Zacks & Ciceric, SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,925, at 78,666 
(Dec. 17, 1992) 
4.2.2 Section 602.02.c.ii of the Codification, Example 3 
4.2.3 AICPA Interpretation 101-3 
4.2.4 AICPA Ethics Ruling 39  
4.2.5 Western Mining correspondence 
4.3 Temporary” or “Emergency” Arrangements under SEC Independence 
Requirements 
4.3.1 William I. Minoletti & Co., P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,632 at 78,922 
(Mar. 27, 1984). 
4.3.2 Adler Blanchard & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,929, at 78,669 
(Mar. 11, 1991).  
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4.3.3 Stanton, Magedanz, Edens & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,114, at 
76,552 (June 17, 1985). 
4.3.4 Caldwell, Becker, Dervin, Petrick & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act 
LEXIS 909 (May 10, 1995). 
4.3.5 Section 602.02.c.ii of the Codification, Example 6 
4.3.6 Section 602.02.g of the Codification, Example 12 
5. Proposed response 
5.1 The provision of share registry services by the Merged Firm to Telstra, 
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee for a limited period of time not to extend 
beyond June 30, 1999 would not impair the Merged Firm’s independence 
with respect to audit work performed subsequent to the merger related to 
financial statements included in registration statements, forms and reports 
filed with the SEC under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.  
6. Supporting rationale 
 TIRT and the ESOP Trustee 
 
6.1 The provision of share registry services to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee 
would not give rise to any potential for self-review. 
6.1.1 Neither TIRT, nor the ESOP Trustee, is an audit client of PW or 
C&L or will be an audit client of the Merged Firm.  Rather, the 
Auditor General serves as the auditor of both entities. 
6.1.2 The financial accounts of TIRT and the ESOP Trustee will not be 
consolidated with those of Telstra.   
6.1.3 The records maintained by C&L in relation to registry services 
provided to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee (i) do not form the basis 
for the preparation or review of accounting entries or financial 
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records of Telstra, (ii) have no bearing on the financial statements 
of Telstra, and (iii) are not accounting records. 
6.2 The services provided to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee do not involve the 
assumption of managerial responsibilities of Telstra, because Telstra does 
not manage either entity.  Both entities are managed independently of 
Telstra.  The fiduciary obligations of TIRT and the ESOP Trustee are owed  
to trust beneficiaries, not to Telstra.  TIRT owes its fiduciary obligations to 
Instalment Receipt holders, who possess rights similar to those of 
shareholders (e.g., voting rights, rights to distributions).  The ESOP Trustee 
owes its fiduciary obligations to participants in Telstra’s employee share 
ownership plan (prior to the Share Transfer, to participating employees 
holding instalment receipts and, thereafter, to employee shareholders to the 
extent of payment of the second instalment). 
 Telstra 
 
6.3 Potential independence issues relating to Telstra would not arise until early 
December, 1998, when TIRT transfers the Telstra shares to the Instalment 
Receipt holders.  Maintenance of the Telstra share register will be merely a 
formality prior to that time, because the register will list only two 
shareholders:  the Commonwealth and TIRT. 
6.4 Independence is not impaired after the Share Transfer, because:   
6.4.1 C&L Australia partners are currently pursuing a plan to divest the 
share registry practice within a reasonable and limited period not to 
extend beyond the end of Telstra’s fiscal year on June 30, 1999.  In 
this regard, C&L Australia has retained an adviser, prepared an 
information memorandum, and initiated contact with a number of 
potential purchasers. 
6.4.2 No partner of the Merged Firm other than present partners of C&L 
Australia will derive any benefit from the provision of share 
registry services to Telstra.  This is because C&L Australia will 
transfer the share registry line of business to the SRS Entity prior 
to the Merger.  The SRS Entity will be owned by the present 
 
50 
partners of C&L Australia.  Further, the present C&L Australia 
partners will be walled off from any audit services performed for 
Telstra.  Such services will be the sole responsibility of the former 
PW partners.  Thus, the partners who provide audit services to 
Telstra will not derive any benefit from the share registry 
engagement.  The segregation of audit and share registry partners, 
together with the other factors we have outlined, mitigates any 
potential threat to independence. 
6.4.3 The ASX advises registrars electronically of share transfers arising 
from market trades.  Such transfers are expected to account for 
99.7% of the changes in volume on the Telstra share register.  The 
ASX also retains independent auditors (KPMG) to review the 
reliability and integrity of its electronic settlement system and 
share transfers arising from market trades.  The audit team (i.e., the 
former PW personnel) will rely on the opinion of the Auditor 
General, which in turn relies on the opinion of KPMG, with 
respect to these transfers.  
6.4.4 The SRS Entity will perform data entry with respect to non-market 
transfers only, which will account for a de minimis percentage 
(0.3%) of the changes in volume on the Telstra share register.  
6.4.5 If divestiture has not occurred prior to the Share Transfer, the SRS 
Entity will provide share registry services to Telstra for only a 
limited period which will not extend beyond June 30, 1999, so that 
the divestiture may be completed in an orderly fashion. 
6.4.6 The SEC Staff advised C&L Australia to cease providing share 
registry services to an audit client, Western Mining Corporation, in 
1993.  As will be evident from a review of the correspondence in 
Western Mining, the facts and circumstances considered there are 
clearly distinguishable from those presented in paragraphs 6.3 
through 6.4.5.  It should be noted further that, C&L Australia had 
provided both share registry and audit services to Western Mining 
Corporation for an extended period of time, as contrasted with the 
situation here where the issue arises only as result of a merger and 
 
51 
a limited transitional period is contemplated during which the 
shareholder registry services practice will be divested. 
 The Appearance of Independence  
 
6.5 The Commission has stated that the appearance of independence is to be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant 
facts and circumstances.  We believe that the facts and circumstances 
described herein mitigate any potential threat to independence, and that a 
reasonable investor would not perceive any impairment.  In this regard, we 
note particularly that the Australian Securities Commission sanctions the 
provision of share registry services to audit clients, and that the Bank of 
New York, not C&L Australia, serves as Telstra’s transfer agent with 
respect to ADRs traded on the New York Stock Exchange.  In light of these 
and the other mitigating facts and circumstances described herein, we 
believe that a reasonable investor would perceive the Merged Firm as 
having neither mutual nor conflicting interests with Telstra and as 
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to its 
attention.  
7. Alternatives considered and why rejected 
7.1 C&L and PW considered continuing both share registry services and audit 
services on a long-term basis.  The firms rejected this option for a number 
of business reasons. 
8. If confidential treatment requested, explain why it should be granted 
8.1 We request confidential treatment of this matter because (i) C&L’s 
discussions with the ISB Staff, (ii) C&L’s plans to divest the share registry 
business, and (iii) Telstra’s plans with respect to further securities offerings, 
constitute confidential commercial or financial information, the public 
disclosure of which could cause harm to C&L and Telstra and interfere 
with the orderly divestiture of the share registry business. 
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9. Expedited Consideration 
9.1 We request expedited consideration of this Request for 
Interpretation/Advice.  As indicated, the issue will arise when the merger 
takes effect in July, 1998.  Telstra wishes to be assured as to the Merged 
Firm’s independence well in advance of that date.  Accordingly, favorable 
action is sought by the end of May, 1998. 
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